I have previously written about investing in the Asia Pacific region and why it is crucial that investors take a balanced and comprehensive long-term investment view (see ‘Capitalising on the Pacific Decade’). The prevailing market view on the region remains negative, mainly centring on China’s debt problem and general doubts about Abenomics. This article focuses on some aspects of this negativity from a sovereign balance sheet perspective and concludes that the potential dangers are overstated.
When analysing stocks, investors consider both balance sheet and income statements. But when it comes to sovereign analysis, analysts often focus more on the latter, which consist of ‘flow’ related economic data (such as GDP, trade, employment, production, capital flow, government budget) but place less importance on the former. Regarding a sovereign’s balance sheet data (national debt, current account), there is a tendency to focus solely on the government itself, ignoring the household or corporate sectors. Focusing on flow data makes sense for an open economy such as the US, where most of the productive sectors of the economy are held in the private sector via capital markets. The government plays a limited role on the asset side of the aggregate balance sheet. However, it can lead to incomplete or misleading conclusions in the case of Japan.
Japan: the misconception of too much debt
One of international investors’ major concerns regarding Japan is the government’s high debt level, without taking into account the household and corporate sectors. However, Japan’s national wealth largely resides in the household and corporate sectors, which makes the government’s heavy debt less of a concern. It also means that Japan is much less vulnerable to the sort of capital flight by offshore investors that often triggers financial crises.
As of 2014, the household sector’s financial net worth stood at 280% of GDP, which represents one of the highest levels globally and compares well with US at 260%. In contrast, the government’s debt to GDP ratio has risen significantly over the past two decades, from 67% in 1990 to 248% in 2015. In effect, the government has been forced to borrow to stimulate its economy because the household and corporate sectors refuse to consume and invest, instead choosing to save. So while the income statement of the country has remained flat for the best part of a decade, the national wealth is strong and Japan is able to export those savings to finance other countries’ deficits.
It’s not just the household sector that has accumulated significant wealth, the corporate sector also has a significant savings glut. Japanese companies are well known for sitting on large cash positions and being reluctant to invest. Japan’s listed companies hold over USD 1 trillion in cash and 56% of these companies are totally debt-free, i.e. net cash.
Japan’s economy has effectively become similar in position to a wealthy, ageing rentier, living off years of accumulated savings. The country’s strong balance sheet position allows the government room to experiment as it aims to change the deflationary mindset of an entire population and stimulate private demand. A bank run scenario is highly unlikely in Japan, which is why comparable debt analysis for heavily indebted countries is not relevant.
Most sovereign analysis on Japan ignores the wealth residing outside the government sector and over-emphasises the government’s deficit spending. The push for a higher sales tax, due to concerns about the government’s high debt ratio, was the wrong prescription for Japan. Prime Minister Abe’s first consumption tax hike was a costly policy error for Abenomics as it unwound the momentum and positive early effects from the government’s stimulus programme. The recent decision to postpone the second hike was the right call.
The country’s strong balance sheet also explains the ‘safe haven’ status of the Japanese Yen and its recent strength. Other reasons for Yen strength include the country’s surging current account as a result of a significant change in the net trade balance from 2014 to 2016 due to lower oil imports and because declining inflation expectations, not nominal interest rates, are driving foreign exchange rates. Real interest rates in Japan have actually been rising more than the US, because expected inflation rates are collapsing5.
Abenomics was initially quite effective for the economy and the Nikkei until the first sales tax hike took place in 2014. The BOJ’s ‘Halloween easing’ in 2014 further pushed the Yen from USD 110 to 120 and the Nikkei up to 20,000. However, without further action, the Yen strengthened for the reasons stated above and the Nikkei retreated to 2014 levels.
In our view, the Yen will tend to strengthen unless BOJ Governor Kuroda’s resolve to raise inflation expectations regains credibility. Unfortunately, the BOJ’s monetary policy has been doing much of Abenomics’ heavy lifting over the past couple of years and has few bullets left. Further bond buying and even more negative rates have lost their potency because these monetary signals are not affecting the demand side of the economy. What is required now is even stronger fiscal policy. The combination of strong fiscal and monetary policies should help to raise inflation expectations and lower the Yen.
The question is not if the BOJ and the government will act, but when and how. Recently, market participants have been openly debating the possibility of debt monetisation or ‘helicopter money’ in Japan. In my view, when quantitative easing and NIRP are coordinated with a stronger stimulus programme, the effect on the economy and general inflation expectations will be similar to more controversial forms of monetary policy. The difference between this and the BOJ deciding to directly underwrite the debt incurred by the Ministry of Finance is merely a matter of semantics.
Yu-Ming Wang is Global Head of Investment and Chief Investment Officer, International at Nikko AM.
By Alicia Miguel Serrano